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Abstract
This paper investigates whether an inefficient allocation of abatement, due to constraints
on the use of currently available low carbon mitigation options, can promote innovation
in new technologies and eventually generate welfare gains. We focus on the case of
nuclear power phase out, when accounting for endogenous technical change in energy
efficiency and in low carbon technologies. The analysis uses the Integrated Assessment
Model WITCH, which features multiple externalities due to both climate and innovation
market failures. Our results show that phasing out nuclear power stimulates additional
R&D investments and deployment of infant technologies with large learning potential.
The innovation benefits which this would generate and that would not otherwise be
captured due to intertemporal and international externalities almost completely offsets the
economic costs of phasing out nuclear power. The technological change benefit depends
on the stringency of the climate policy and is distributed unevenly across countries.

1. Introduction
When GHG emissions are the only externality, a uniform carbon tax or a global cap and
trade scheme with full when, where, and what flexibility would achieve the most efficient
abatement allocation across polluting sources, regions, and technologies. In the context of
climate change, this basic principle has been substantiated by a number of modeling
comparison exercises, showing that a wider technology portfolio minimizes abatement
costs. For policy, this means that no technology should get a special treatment, as the
efficient allocation of mitigation effort would be ensured by the economic signal of
carbon pricing.
Technology externalities can make the case for differentiated climate policies across
sectors and technologies. When learning effects and international spillovers are not
accounted for by the regulator, the optimal policy needs to differ from the first-best one
(Goulder and Schneider 1999, Goulder and Mathai 2000, Gerlagh et al. 2009). Secondbest policies exceed the Pigovian tax because a tighter emission requirement is a way of
compensating for the lack of technology policy (Golombek and Hoel 2006, De Cian and
1
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Tavoni 2012). In a cost-effective setting, multiple externalities affect the cost-minimizing
abatement allocation, and welfare gains might arise from a differentiation in marginal
abatement costs (Rosendahl 2004, Bramoullé and Olson 2005, Otto et al. 2008). In
particular, technology externalities provide an incentive to differentiate their pollution tax
to technologies with relatively high technology externalities associated to them.
Bramoullé and Olson (2005) show that a policy that equalizes the instantaneous marginal
costs of abatement between technologies is not optimal under learning by doing.
Technology policies that affect the technological trajectory towards sectors with high
learning and high spillovers potential might lower the costs of achieving a climate change
targets.
This paper investigates whether second-best allocation of abatement across technologies
is inefficient and to what extent welfare gains arise if technologies feature learning
potential and international externalities. In particular, we examine the technology and
welfare implications of an inefficient abatement allocation due to the phase out of nuclear
energy after 2010. The analysis uses the Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) WITCH.
The model provides a compact, but rich characterization of the energy system and its
technology dynamics, both in terms of learning and innovation. Different technologies are
characterized on the basis of their stage of development. Infant technologies, represented
in the model as breakthrough substitutes of conventional options, feature much higher
learning and innovation externalities potentials, while conventional technologies are
assumed not have learning. These elements are fully integrated into a macroeconomic
model of economic growth. Therefore, welfare implications can be analyzed in a
consistent way. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
a standard abatement model with technology externalities. Section 3 describes the
motivation and the experiment design. Section 4 presents the integrated assessment
model. Section 5 illustrates the results. Section 6 concludes.

2. Abatement allocation with two technologies
A simple static example can be used to illustrate the case for differentiated policy
incentives across technologies. Consider a two-technology model where the two
technologies,
, can be used to achieve a given level of abatement. Let us assume
that technology 1 has a constant marginal costs,

, while technology 2 features

intertemporal as well as international externalities generated by experience,
and knowledge,

,

,

. Intertemporal externalities occur because

learning by doing is external to the maximizing region. Learning benefits ( ) occur as a
side effect of capacity accumulation in technologies, but they are not taken into account
in the optimization process (Arrow, 1962). International externalities occur because
regions investing in R&D cannot fully protect their inventive activity. Patents are
temporary and do not allow to appropriate the full benefits of R&D (Romer, 1986).
Therefore, R&D investments in each given region i contribute to the creation of a stock of
knowledge that has an external effect on regional abatement costs, . Since increased
abatement today lowers costs at all future dates, the optimal allocation of abatement
across technologies depends on the marginal effect abatement today has on the entire time
path of abatement costs. What should be actually equalized are the adjusted marginal
2
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abatement costs (Bramoullé and Olson, 2005), that is the marginal abatement costs of
abatement less the cumulative cost reduction due to learning by doing and knowledge
spillovers:
=
where

This has two implications. Excluding technology options with high externalities leads to
higher penalties than excluding technologies without externalities because it also foregoes
the associated externalities. Given two alternative abatement technologies such as
technology 1 and 2, inducing more abatement in the option with higher learning
potentials and externalities can lead to Pareto improvements. This is illustrated by a
simple static example in Figure 1.

Fig. 1 A simple example with two abatement technology and learning externalities

The top-left panel shows the cost-effective abatement allocation between technology 1
and 2, a1, a2. Consider now a cap on the amount of abatement that can be achieved with
the cheapest technology, a1. As shown in the top-right panel of Figure 1, marginal
abatement costs would no longer be equalized and the marginal abatement cost of option
2 would exceed that of option 1, as too much abatement is left to the less efficient
technology 2. This leads to a welfare loss represented by the red area in the bottom-left
panel. This would be the end of the story if there were no link between abatement and
3
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technology costs. If the costs of the most expensive technology instead depend on
abatement and R&D (not shown in the chart), then a situation like the one depicted in the
bottom-right panel could emerge. The greater abatement allocated to technology 2
induces learning that reduces the technology cost, leading to a lower net welfare loss,
represented by the smaller red area.
This simple example provides a rationale for subsidizing learning technologies (e.g.
renewables, see Badcock and Lenzen, 2010). Constraining the use of mature technologies
(e.g. nuclear) is equivalent to a subsidy to all remaining mitigation options, including
technologies subject to learning (which can be either dirty or clean). In the next sections
we set forth to quantify these benefits using an IAM.

3. Motivation and experiment design
After the disaster occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (March 2011), a
debate mainly focused on the safety of this energy technology has risen in many countries
of the world, especially in Western Europe, leading in some cases to a re-thinking of the
nuclear option. In Germany, which at that date featured seventeen reactors, the
government ordered the immediate shutdown of the eldest eight, with a progressive
phasing out of the remainders to be completed within 2022. It is evident how political that
decision was, as just the previous year a law aimed at extending the operational life of the
more modern nuclear plants until 2038 had been approved. Indeed, it must be said that
this choice did not have major impacts on the 2011 electricity import/export balance
(Loreck, 2012) nor on GHG emissions (Umweltbundesamt, 2012), which actually
decreased with respect to 2010, even if long-term impacts on electricity price are difficult
to forecast (Pahle et al., 2012). The Swiss government pronounced immediately after the
accident, announcing a complete phase out of nuclear according to the pre-determined
schedule (i.e. between 2019 and 2034) and blocking the projects concerning the
construction of three new plants. An analogous scenario has been taking shape in
Belgium, whose government has fixed the shutdown of the national seven plants between
2015 and 2025. In Italy, a similar post-Chernobyl situation took place. In late 80s, the
government decided the abandonment of nuclear energy, shutting down the four existing
plants and blocking the construction of additional two. The decision reflected the public
aversion emerged in a national referendum held in 1987, one year after the disaster in the
former Soviet Union. In late 2000s, the government decided to re-start a nuclear program,
planning to meet 25% of the internal electricity demand with such a source within twenty
years, but again a post-incident referendum determined a stop to this policy. The recently
released 2020 energy national program excludes nuclear as a deployable option.
Obviously the most considerable consequences were felt in Japan, where the disaster
heavily impacted on the population, and the effects on the nuclear energy policies have
been accordingly substantial. Immediately after the incident, which directly caused the
loss of four reactors, all the other fifty were shut down for safety checks, planning a
gradual re-start of the safer ones in the following months. Before the accident, 30% of
Japan electricity demand was covered by nuclear, with plans of up-scaling up to 50% by
2030. After the accident, the government released a new energy plan which scheduled a
gradual phasing out of the operating plants by 2040.
4
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper747

4

De Cian et al.: Innovation Benefits from Nuclear Phase-out: Can they Compens

It must be said that many countries have not modified their plans of continuation or
development of their nuclear programs. Among them, we can mention China, Russia,
Republic of Korea (which inaugurated two reactors in 2012) and India. United States too
have confirmed nuclear as a strategic energy source for the nation, even if very few
projects have concretely been moving forward.
Setting aside single countries’ intentions, it must be noted that out of the 437 nuclear
reactors operating worldwide as of October 2012, 349 are more than twenty years old.
Therefore, despite the development programs (64 reactors are under construction, 160 are
planned), it is possible to forecast a short- to medium-term reduction in electric output
from nuclear plants due to the decommissioning of old plants not fully replaced by new
ones.
However, if the Fukushima-Daiichi incident boosted the debate on nuclear energy, and in
particular on the safety issues, it is true that other criticisms rose in recent years even
before that fact, mainly focusing on the nuclear waste disposal or treatment and on cost
and time uncertainties, which, especially in the new European plants, have been showing
considerable increases in this sense with respect to the planned ones (Hass, 2012). As a
result, although it is difficult to draw definitive trends throughout the century, after a
decade in which construction starts of new plants had progressively increased, in the last
two years the number of construction starts showed a considerable drop (see Figure 2).

Fig. 2 Construction starts of new reactors sorted by years

Against this background, evaluating scenarios of phasing out nuclear power becomes a
policy relevant exercise. Relevant questions concern implications on the technology mix,
induced innovation and technology development, and welfare. To the extent to which
nuclear power is a CO2-free option and therefore its value increases in mitigation
scenarios (Tavoni et al., 2012), phasing out nuclear power would induce a second-best
allocation of abatement. The extent to which this second-best abatement allocation
generates efficiency losses and positive technology externalities is an empirical question
that we address using the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH (see Section 4 and 5).
This investigation represents a novel contribution to the literature because, to our
knowledge, the innovation implications of the nuclear phase out has never been addressed
5
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in the literature. In fact, if the nuclear phase out is a typical scenario considered in all
comparison exercises, while the analysis of additional nuclear power policies is much
rarer, see Bauer et al. (2012), models normally focus on the rearrangement of the
electricity mix and on the climatic and economic impacts of this technology constraint,
but secondary effects on new technologies and innovation are never examined in detail1.
Regarding the theoretical considerations, the nuclear phase out case offers a case study
that mimics very closely the simple example given in Section 2. The WITCH model,
which is used for the numerical analysis and described in Section 3, characterizes power
generation from different technology options, including nuclear power, renewables, and
breakthrough technologies with endogenous costs. In the jargon of the analytical model of
Section 2, nuclear power represents an example of technology 1, with lower but constant
investment costs. Wind power and the breakthrough technology are alternatives with
characteristics similar to technology 2, as costs decline with abatement and R&D in the
case of the breakthrough technology. The breakthrough technology is not meant to
represent a specific technology choice, but it could be associated with nuclear fusion or
with advanced generation, waste-free nuclear fission.
These two technology options generate positive technology externalities. Therefore, the
nuclear phase out offers a case study for analyzing in a quantitative way the qualitative
conclusion formulated at the end of Section 2, namely that constraining the use of mature
technologies (e.g. nuclear) is equivalent to a subsidy and that subsiding early-stage
technologies can create welfare gains. In Section 5 we explore whether this conclusion
holds across policy regimes and regions.
Incidentally, there is no doubt at all that nuclear power can be considered a mature
technology, having been deployed starting from the 50s and definitively consolidated
during the 70s and 80s. As such, it is characterized by low learning rates and potentials,
and specifically lower than the other technologies with which it would compete (KahouliBrahmi, 2008).
The experiment is designed as described in Table 1. Four technology scenarios have been
taken into account. In the “With All Technologies” case, no constraint is set on the energy
options portfolio, which thus is fully optimized. In the other three cases, instead, nuclear
power is subject to phase out, which means no construction of new nuclear power plants

1

It is not within the scopes of this paper, instead, to deeply investigate what could be the
technology solutions to replace nuclear. It suffices to say that there is an on-going debate on this
issue. In fact, nuclear plants guarantee full-load electricity supply throughout the year without
emitting carbon dioxide, which makes them a more valuable option in a climate mitigation
perspective. Renewable energies are basically carbon-free as well, and some studies depict a 100%
renewable scenario for the electric system (Steinke, 2013) or even for the whole energy sector
(Delucchi and Jacobson, 2011a and 2011b). However, the well-known intermittency problems
make their use as base or intermediate load plants very difficult, if not impossible, without a
proper backup capacity, which in a way only reformulates the problem (Trainer, 2012). On the
other hand, any alternative option involving fossil fuels would necessarily entail the coupling of a
CCS system in order to limit the impact in terms of carbon dioxide (Tavoni and van der Zwaan,
2009).
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beyond those already under construction or planned (thus excluding proposed ones), with
no lifetime extensions. In the “With Nuclear Phase Out” case no other constraints are
imposed, and in particular R&D investments and the deployment of technologies
characterized by LbD freely adjust according to the new technology framework. In “With
Nuclear Phase Out w/o innovation benefits” R&D investments are instead fixed to the
“With All Technologies” case, even if investments in innovative energy technology are
not constrained. Finally, in “With Nuclear Phase Out w/o technology benefits” both R&D
investments and investments in learning technologies are fixed to the reference case in
order to completely remove any benefit deriving from the redirection of investments from
mature nuclear power to renewables and breakthrough.
All these scenarios have been run under three different policy cases, i.e. Baseline, where
no constraint is imposed to GHG emissions, 450ppme and 550ppme, where a predetermined emission path is fixed, in order to achieve a GHG concentration in 2100 equal
to the corresponding value, as will be better described in Section 5.

Table 1 Scenario matrix

Policy cases

Baseline//450ppme//550ppme

Technology assumptions

With All
Technologies

With Nuclear
Phase Out

All technology
investments are
chosen
optimally

No new nuclear
power plants
beyond those
under
construction/
planned.

R&D
investments and
the deployment
of technologies
characterized
by LbD freely
adjust.

With Nuclear
Phase Out w/o
innovation
benefits

With Nuclear
Phase Out w/o
technology
benefits

No new nuclear
power plants
beyond those
under
construction/
planned.

No new nuclear
power plants
beyond those
under
construction/
planned.

R&D
investments are
fixed to ‘all
technologies’
levels. The
deployment of
technologies
characterized
by LbD freely
adjusts.

R&D
investments and
the deployment
of technologies
characterized
by LbD are
fixed to ‘all
technologies’
levels.
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4. Innovation and technology dynamics in the
WITCH model
The numerical analysis is performed with the WITCH model2, an energy-economy model
that features multiple externalities. A full description of the model can be found in Bosetti
et al. (2006) and Bosetti et al. (2009). A more recent description of R&D and learning
dynamics are presented in De Cian et al. (2012). Here we briefly discuss how the
externalities are represented in the model.
WITCH is a dynamic, optimal growth model with a focus on the energy sector and on
GHG mitigation options. It consists of thirteen aggregated regions, denoted with n. Model
regions behave independently with respect to all major economic decision variables,
including investments and fossil fuel use, by playing a non-cooperative game.
Technological change in energy efficiency and specific clean technologies is endogenous
and reacts to price and policy signals. Technological innovation and diffusion processes
are also subject to international and intertemporal spillovers. This implies that the Nash
equilibrium, which is the model solution, does not internalize the technology
externalities.
The technology externality is modeled via international and intertemporal spillovers of
knowledge and experience across countries and over time. The innovation externality
takes the form of international spillovers of knowledge embodied in the energy sector. In
each given model region, n, the stock knowledge for technology i,
evolves over time
with domestic investments

and a global stock of knowledge,

:
(1)

where investments in R&D are combined with cumulated stock of existing national
knowledge,
to account for standing on shoulder effects (intertemporal externalities),
and foreign knowledge,

, to account for international externalities:
(2)

The knowledge frontier is represented by the total stock of knowledge available in top
innovator countries, the OECD, and it is taken as an externality by each optimizing
region.
The two stages of innovation and diffusion are combined in a two-factor learning curve
specification for investment costs. Investment costs of some technologies (see Table 2)
are an endogenous function of the knowledge stock (Learning-By-Researching) and
installed capacity (Learning-By-Doing). Learning-By-Researching (first term in eq. [3])
occurs before the technology penetrates the market, while Learning-By-Doing (second
term in eq. [3]) operates when technology deployment starts:
(3)

2

See www.witchmodel.org for model description and related papers.

8
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(4)

The available technologies i include energy efficiency improvements, fossil-fuel-based
technologies in power sector, fossil-fuel-based technologies in final use sectors, carbonfree technologies in power sector, carbon-free technologies in final use sectors,
breakthrough technologies.3 Table 2 summarizes the characterization of externalities for
the various technologies represented in the WITCH model.

Table 2 Technology and innovation externalities represented in the WITCH model

Fossil-fuel
based
technologies

Fossil-fuel
based
technologies
with CCS

Renewable
Nuclear
energy
power
(Wind)

Breakthrough
technologies

Innovation
Hi
externalities

NA

NA

NA

NA

YES

θi,1

NA

NA

NA

0

YES

NA

NA

NA

YES

YES

NA

NA

NA

YES

YES

Technology Zi
externalities
θi,2

Nuclear power can be replaced by fossil-based technologies with and without CCS, wind
power, and a breakthrough technology. The two latter options, and in particular the
breakthrough, are less mature than fossil-based technologies and therefore generate a
greater amount of externalities. For more details on the representation of these
technologies in terms of costs and potential, we refer the reader to the model website and
papers contained therein.
Despite the endogenous characterization of knowledge formation and learning, the
representation of technical change is still a simplification of actual dynamics. First of all,

3

Electricity can be generated using fossil fuel based technologies and carbon-free options. Fossilfuel-based technologies include natural gas combined cycle (NGCC), oil- and pulverized coalbased power plants. Integrated gasification combined cycle power plants equipped with carbon
capture and storage (CCS) are also modeled. Zero carbon technologies include hydroelectric and
nuclear power plants, wind turbines and photovoltaic panels (Wind&Solar). The end-use sector
uses traditional biomass, biofuels, coal, gas, and oil. Oil and gas together account for more than
70% of energy consumption in the non-electric sector. Instead, the use of coal and traditional
biomass is limited to some developing regions and decreases over time. First generation biofuels
consumption is currently low in all regions of the world and the overall penetration remains
modest over time given the conservative assumptions on their large scale deployment.
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the model is fully deterministic and it assumes that innovation or learning reduce
technology costs when they reach a certain level. Second, we do not model technological
change in less mature technologies, such as fossil-fuel based technologies and extraction
technologies.
On the one hand, since this study neglects the endogenous innovation dynamics in the
conventional sector, our results might overestimate the welfare gains associated with the
nuclear phase out. This would actually be the case if nuclear phase out stimulated
investments in technologies, such as natural gas, which have lower learning potentials.
On the other hand, since we do not account for the learning potential and externalities in
CCS technologies, our results might underestimate the welfare gains associated with the
nuclear phase out.

5. Model solution and results
The model outcome is the solution of a non-cooperative game between native regions. In
the baseline scenarios, model’s regions choose investments in final goods and energy
technologies in order to maximize utility under a set of technology constrains. In the
policy scenarios, regions solve the same program, but under the additional constraint on
regional GHG emissions. The regional emission caps are computed on the basis of a
Contraction & Convergence scheme (Meyer, 2000). The global optimal GHG caps
consistent with the long-term targets of 450 and 550ppme are determined by solving the
model in a cooperative way. A unique global social planner maximizes global aggregate
welfare under a radiative forcing constraint. Full when and where flexibility is allowed,
and countries can buy and sell carbon permits on the international carbon market.
It is important to stress that, when optimizing their own welfare, regions do not
internalize innovation and technology externalities, e.g. international spillovers of
knowledge and the learning effects occur outside the decision process, after solving for
the optimal choice of investments. The presence of positive externalities which are not
fully internalized leads to the under-provision of the public goods knowledge and
deployment of learning technologies. To the extent the model solution does not
internalize these benefits, it represents a second-best outcome. In a second best context,
where market failures cannot be easily removed, an additional distortion or failure can
help to improve the economic equilibrium when a policy is implemented (Lipsey and
Lancaster, 1956).
Nuclear power is a carbon-free source of power. If social and environmental concerns did
not limit the extent to which countries rely on this source for electricity generation, the
WITCH model would foresee a continued use of the technology, and in 2100 nuclear
would generate between 10% and 50% of the global electricity production, in the baseline
and in the most stringent policy case considered (450ppme). Should this technology be
excluded from the portfolio of feasible options, then countries would revise their energy
mix by modifying their investment strategy.
In a baseline scenario this means more investments in coal and gas (but only in the short
term, i.e. until 2025-2030), more renewables and more clean power R&D (breakthrough).
The breakthrough starts to replace nuclear power as well as fossil-based technologies in
10
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2030. In a policy scenario nuclear phase out translates into more investments in fossil
technologies in combination with CCS (coal and gas), renewables and clean power R&D
(breakthrough), which is anticipated by five (550ppme) and ten years (450ppme) with
respect to the baseline. The breakthrough starts to replace nuclear power as well as fossilbased technologies in 2020 (450ppme) and 2025 (550ppme). Under all the policy regimes
considered, the phase out of nuclear power induces investments in early stage
technologies and innovation that feature higher learning potential and international
externalities compared to the alternatives that are displaced. As a consequence, the
economic penalty, measured as increase in policy costs, is partly compensated by the
welfare improvements due to the penetration of technologies with externalities.
Figure 3 decomposes the penalty of phasing out nuclear into the gross component (gross
of technology and innovation benefits) and the technology and innovation benefits. The
two blue bars show the discounted world consumption loss at 450ppme in 2100 with a
full technology portfolio (left) and with a constrained one, i.e. with nuclear phase out
(right). Phasing out nuclear increases the aggregate discounted cost of the stabilization
policy only slightly, from 2.06 to 2.12% (blue bars). Technology benefits reduce the
macroeconomic loss by 0.5% (violet bar). Policy costs would increase to 2.62%, should
the technology benefits be excluded. That is, the technology benefits due to implicit
subsidy to learning technologies caused by the nuclear phase out is able to almost
completely offset the cost of losing an important mitigation option, which otherwise
would be substantial (by 27% in the 450ppme and 42% in the 550ppme).4 A similar result
holds in the 550ppme and in the BAU scenarios, where technology benefits reduce the
macroeconomic loss by 0.35% and 0.14%, respectively.
Figure 4 traces the positive relationship between technology benefits and an indicator of
policy stringency, namely cumulative abatement to 2100. Technology benefits are
defined as the percentage point difference between the percentage change in discounted
GDP/consumption in the 450/550ppme With Nuclear Phase Out w/o technology benefits
compared to relative BAU (policy costs) and the same policy cost indicator computed in
the 450/550ppme With Nuclear Phase Out. In the BAU we computed the percentage
change in discounted GDP/consumption compared to the case With All Technologies.
The technology benefit is defined as the percentage point difference between the
percentage change in GDP/consumption in the BAU With Nuclear Phase Out w/o
technology benefits and the BAU With Nuclear Phase Out. Technology benefits increase
with policy stringency in absolute value. When measured relative to the total costs of the
policy without nuclear they show diminishing returns, the benefits actually decrease when
the policy becomes more stringent, from 38% of total costs in the 550ppme case to 29%
in the 450ppme case. This is due to a saturation effect of the productivity of the
innovation effort. As expected, the technology benefit is also positively correlated with
cumulative investments in R&D, renewable energy and breakthrough.

4

Policy costs measured in terms of GDP are larger, but we focus on consumption as a better indicator of
welfare. The GDP losses without nuclear power would be 3.23% and it would increase to 4.19%, should
technology benefits be excluded.
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Fig. 3 Decomposing the technology penalty from technology benefits (450ppme): consumption
net present losses compared to Baseline (5% discounting).

Technology benefits are defined as the percentage point difference between the percentage
change in discounted consumption in the 450ppme With Nuclear Phase Out w/o technology
benefits compared to relative BAU (policy costs) and the same policy cost indicator computed in
the 450ppme With Nuclear Phase Out.

Fig. 4 Technology benefits and policy stringency measures in consumption NPV losses (red dots)
and GDP NPV losses (blue dots).

Technology benefits are defined as the percentage point difference between the percentage
change in discounted GDP/consumption in the 450/550ppme With Nuclear Phase Out w/o
technology benefits compared to relative BAU (policy costs) and the same policy cost indicator
computed in the 450/550ppme With Nuclear Phase Out. In the BAU we computed the percentage
change in discounted GDP/consumption compared to the case With All Technologies. The
technology benefit is defined as the percentage point difference between the percentage change
in GDP/consumption in the BAU With Nuclear Phase Out w/o technology benefits and the BAU
With Nuclear Phase Out.

12
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Discounted policy costs are a great indicator for comparing scenarios, but they do not
inform about the intertemporal dynamics. Figure 5 illustrates the temporal distribution of
innovation and learning benefits. It indicates that phasing out nuclear power would have
only a transitory penalty in the case of a 550ppme policy. The panel on the right shows
that after 2035 technology benefits are significantly large to offset the efficiency loss. A
450ppme stabilization policy case shows relatively larger benefits in the near term, until
2030, mostly due the innovation effect. The penalty of phasing out nuclear becomes
positive in the longer term, after 2050. In the case of the more stringent policy,
technology benefits counteract the efficiency loss, but only in the short-, medium-term.
Over time, the efficiency effect prevails.

Fig. 5 Temporal distribution of technology benefits – 450ppme (left) and 550ppme (right).
Consumption losses w.r.t. Baseline

It is instructive to analyze the regional distribution of the technology benefits of phasing
out nuclear, see Figure 6. In the 450ppme case (left panel), we find greater technology
benefits in the regions that would rely more on nuclear power, especially in the more
stringent case of a 450ppme stabilization. Not coincidentally, these are also the regions
that decided not to modify their plans of continuation or development of their nuclear
programs in the aftermath of Fukushima, namely China, Russia, Republic of Korea, and
India. However, the regional distribution of the technology benefits reflects also other
effects, such as the trading position of each region on the carbon and on the oil markets
and the interaction with the international prices of oil and carbon permits. These channels
seem to have a stronger impact in the less stringent case of a 550ppme policy (right
panel). Consider for example India. Although the share of nuclear power is expected to be
significant, India will be a net seller of permits on the carbon market. Technology
externalities can induce a loss compared to the case with no technology benefits in net
carbon credit exporters, such as India and Latin America (LACA), because technology
benefits reduce the carbon price when the stabilization target is not very stringent. In the
550ppme case, technology benefits reduce the carbon price at the end of the century by
17%.
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Fig. 6 Regional distribution of technology benefits in the 450 (left panel) and 550ppme (right
panel)

Technology benefits are defined as the percentage point difference between the percentage
change in discounted GDP/consumption in the 450/550ppme With Nuclear Phase Out w/o
technology benefits compared to relative BAU (policy costs) and the same policy cost indicator
computed in the 450/550ppme With Nuclear Phase Out.

6. Conclusion
The nuclear disaster occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March
2011 has led many countries to re-think the role of the nuclear power. The rapid decline
in the costs of competitive low carbon technologies over the most recent years, most
notably renewables, has led some policymakers to articulate that the decarbonization of
the electricity sector is possible without nuclear power, and hopefully at moderate costs.
In Europe, the idea that innovation in new low carbon alternatives can bring economic
opportunities is summarized by Angela Merkel in the following remark "We believe we
as a country can be a trailblazer for a new age of renewable energy sources….We can be
the first major industrialized country that achieves the transition to renewable energy with
all the opportunities - for exports, development, technology, jobs - it carries with it.”
This paper has quantified the implications of a global nuclear phase out on renewable
deployment and innovation in low carbon technologies both under a business as usual and
two different climate stabilization targets, using an integrated assessment model which
features induced technical change and multiple externalities.
Our results show that phasing out nuclear power would stimulate investments in R&D
and deployment of infant technologies with large learning potentials. This could bring
about economic benefits, given the under provision of innovation due to market failures
related to both intertemporal and international externalities. Our numerical assessment
has shown that technology benefits can be substantial and can almost compensate the
costs of foregoing nuclear power as an energy and mitigation option. The timing of the
benefits depends on the stringency of the policy. In a less stringent climate policy, they
take time to materialize. Nuclear phase out would thus lead to a temporary penalty, over
time offset by the positive technology externalities. In the most stringent climate cases,
consistent with 2C policies, innovation and technology benefits counterbalance the
efficiency loss but only in the medium-term, while in the long-term the efficiency loss
prevails. Technology benefits would be distributed unevenly across countries. Assuming
14
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that all world regions phase out nuclear starting in 2010, benefits tend to be greater where
nuclear power provides a larger share of electricity, though other channels such as
international carbon trade and energy markets, also affect the regional distribution of
technology benefits.
Our analysis is not without caveats. We have neglected technical change directed at
conventional sectors, such as fossil fuels with and without CCS. Moreover, the economic
penalty of a nuclear phase out is moderated by the assumption about availability of CCS
at sufficiently large scale. Further analysis could explore to what extent the results
presented in the paper hold in the case of temporary or fragmented phase out.

15
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

15

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 747 [2013]

References
Arrow, K.J., 1962. The economic implications of learning by doing. The Review of
Economic Studies 29 (3), 155–173.
Badcock, J., Lenzen, M., 2010. Subsidies for electricity-generating technologies: A
review. Energy Policy 38 (2010) 5038–5047.
Bauer, N., Brecha, R.J, Luderer, G., 2012. The economics of nuclear power and climate
change mitigation policies. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America, PNAS 109 (42), 16805-16810.
Bosetti, V., Carraro, C., Galeotti, M., Massetti, E., Tavoni, M., 2006. WITCH: A World
Induced Technical Change Hybrid Model. Energy Journal, Special issue on Hybrid
Modeling of Energy-Environment Policies: Reconciling Bottom-up and Top-down, 13-38
Bosetti, V., De Cian, E., Sgobbi, A., Tavoni, M., 2009. The 2008 WITCH Model: New
Model Features and Baseline. Working Papers 2009.85, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
Bramoullé, Y., Olson, L.J., 2005. Allocation of pollution abatement under learning by
doing. Journal of Public Economics 89 (9), 1935–1960.
De Cian, E., Bosetti, V., Tavoni, M., 2012. “Technology innovation and diffusion in less
than ideal climate policies. An assessment with the WITCH model”, Climatic Change,
Special Issue: On the Economics of Decarbonization in an Imperfect World, 114 (1): 121143
De Cian, E. , Tavoni, M., 2012. “Can technology externalities justify carbon trade
restrictions?”, Resource and Energy Economics, 34 (2012) 624– 646
Delucchi, M.A., Jacobson, M.Z., 2011a. Providing all global energy with wind, water,
and solar power, Part I: Technologies, energy resources, quantities and areas of
infrastructure, and materials. Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1154–1169.
Delucchi, M.A., Jacobson, M.Z., 2011b. Providing all global energy with wind, water,
and solar power, Part II: Reliability, system and transmission costs, and policies. Energy
Policy 39 (2011) 1170–1190.
Goulder, L.H., Schneider, S.H., 1999. Induced technological change and the
attractiveness of CO2 abatement policies. Resource and Energy Economics 21 (3–4),
211–253.
Goulder, L.H., Mathai, K., 2000. Optimal CO2 abatement in the presence of induced
technological change. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 39, 1 –38.
Haas, R., Hiesl, A., 2012. Current trends in cost developments of Photovoltaics vs
Nuclear in Europe, Proceedings of the 12th IAEE European Energy Conference, Venice.
Kahouli-Brahmi, S., 2008. Technological learning in energy–environment–economy
modelling: A survey. Energy Policy 36 (2008) 138–162.

16
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper747

16

De Cian et al.: Innovation Benefits from Nuclear Phase-out: Can they Compens

Elmar Kriegler, John Weyant, Geoff Blanford, Leon Clarke, Massimo Tavoni, Volker
Krey, Keywan Riahi, Allen Fawcett, Richard Richels, Jae Edmonds, 2013. Overview of
the EMF 27 Study on Energy System Transition Pathways Under Alternative Climate
Policy Regimes. Climatic Change, this issue.
Lipsey, R.G., Lancaster, L., 1956. The General Theory of Second Best. The Review of
Economic Studies 24, (1): 11--32.
Loreck, C., Atomausstieg in Deutschland, Institute of Applied Technology, Darmstadt,
March 2012.
Meyer, A., 2000. Contraction & convergence. The global solution to climate change.
Schumacher Briefings, 5. Green Books, Bristol, UK.
http://www.gci.org.uk/Briefings/ICE.pdf
Otto, V.M., Löschel, A., Reilly, J., 2008. Directed technical change and differentiation of
climate policy. Energy Economics 30 (2008) 2855–2878.
Pahle, M., Knopf, B., Edenhofer, O., 2012. Germany’s nuclear phase-out: impacts on
electricity prices, Proceedings of the 12th IAEE European Energy Conference, Venice.
Romer, P.M., 1986. Increasing returns and long-run growth. Journal of Political Economy
94, 1002–1037.
Rosendahl, K.E., 2004. Cost-effective environmental policy: implications of induced
technological change. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 48 (3),
1099–1121.
Steinke, F., Wolfrum, P., Hoffmann, C., 2013. Grid vs. storage in a 100% renewable
Europe, Renewable Energy 50 (2013) 826-832.
Tavoni, M., van der Zwaan, B., 2009. Nuclear versus Coal plus CCS: A Comparison of
Two Competitive Base-load Climate Control Options, Working Papers 2009.100,
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
Tavoni, M., De Cian, E., Luderer, G., Steckel, J., Waisman, H., 2012. “The value of
technology and of its evolution towards a low carbon economy”, Climatic Change,
Special Issue: On the Economics of Decarbonization in an Imperfect World, 114 (1): 3957.
Trainer, T., 2012. A critique of Jacobson and Delucchi’s proposals for a world renewable
energy supply. Energy Policy 44: 476–481.
Umweltbundesamt (German Federal Environment Agency), Less greenhouse gases with
less nuclear energy, Press release No. 17/2012.

17
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

17

